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1. Introduction 
In the early 1990s, a surge of democracy had a strong impact in Africa. Single-party 
regimes fell from 29 in 1989 to zero in 1994 and became multiparty regimes (Levitsky and 
Way 2010, 236). However, transitions from authoritarian to democratic states did not 
always take place.  While some African countries succeeded in becoming democratic, 
others returned to the initial authoritarian system or stayed in the process of 
democratization. For instance, elections in Benin in 1996 were considered free and fair, and 
it is now one of the most stable democracies in Africa. On the other hand, Patassé’s self-
interest in Central African Republic blocked democratization despite elections (Mehler 
2011, 122).  
 
This investigation focuses on the significance of elections as a democratizing factor of 
competitive authoritarian regimes. For this purpose, the concept of liberalizing electoral 
outcome is used (Howard and Roessler 2006, 336). Even though there are other factors that 
contribute to democracy (Howard and Roessler 2006, 367), elections are considered a 
powerful mean to drive political change, and a necessary condition for democratic 
consolidation (Lindberg 2009, 45; Lynch 2011, 279). Therefore, the research question to be 
addressed is, ‘Why did liberalizing electoral outcome take place in some sub-Saharan 
African states and not in others?’ 
 
In order to answer this question, the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) 
approach is used. This fairly new approach is considered appropriate in this study and 
innovative for the literature. It introduces combinations of conditions, and not just single 
causal conditions that lead to the result of liberalizing electoral outcome. Therefore, it 
allows for interactions between causal conditions and provides more precise results 
regarding the relationship between elections and the variables under consideration. Besides, 
the evaluation of a group of cases enables some degree of generalization in the analysis of 
conclusions. It is also worth stating that this study is based on the concept of liberalizing 
electoral outcome, which is still underexplored since its introduction by Howard and 
Roessler (2006).   
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This work is structured as follows: firstly, a literature review is presented. It shows what 
has already been said on the topic and includes the hypothesis to be studied. The next 
section is dedicated to the methodology used, which covers a brief introduction of the 
fs/QCA model, a definition of the scope conditions and a description of the variables 
chosen. Afterwards, the procedure is explained in the analysis section, also including the 
results of the application of the fs/QCA model, which testes the hypothesis presented 
before. Finally, an overall conclusion is provided together with suggestions for further 
research.   
 
 
2. Literature review 
Among the literature, different concepts have been used to refer to states going through a 
transition period in the process of democratization. Some of them include hybrid regimes 
(Howard and Roessler 2006), trasitional regimes, anocracies or, as Levitsky and Way 
(2002) establish, competitive authoritarian regimes, which are the focus of this study. In 
these regimes electoral competition is “real but unfair” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 3). Even 
though they engage in democratic practices and competition is allowed among parties, the 
playing field is usually uneven and the ruling party has an operating advantage. Similarly, 
despite the existence of civil liberties, the governing authorities usually violate them. 
Therefore, clientelistic practices put at risk the success of the transition from authoritarian 
to a fully democratic regime (Lewitsky and Way 2010, 5-16).  
 
There are many factors that can cause competitive authoritarian regimes to become 
democratic or move backwards towards an authoritarian regime (Diamond 2008, 88-152; 
Levitsky and Way 2010, 27-32). Four potential explanations are expected to be especially 
relevant for liberalizing electoral outcomes: a) the role of opposition and competition; b) 
clientelistic approaches present in the government; c) the existence of ethnic and cultural 
differences; and d) a change of leader in government.   
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a) Opposition and competition  
The existence of unfair competition is a distinguishing characteristic of competitive 
authoritarian regimes. Even though opposition is legal, there are disadvantages for 
opposition parties, which are sometimes restricted in number (Levitsky and Way 2010, 12). 
Competitive elections are considered a key component in liberalizing electoral outcome and 
may have the strength to push political change forward. However, the emergence of a high 
rate of opposition parties is also identified as problematic, since political competition can 
lead to conflict and violence. Therefore a high rate of opposition parties does not 
necessarily lead to a liberalization of electoral outcome, which can even be undermined 
(LeBas 2011, 11).   
 
The weakness or strength of opposition parties is another important element in this category 
(Rakner and van de Walle 2009; Lindberg 2009; LeBas 2011). It is considered that strong 
opposition parties can protect horizontal accountability, meaning that they can regularly 
check on the incumbent government ensuring the legality of their actions. Besides, they can 
increase the amount of information available, also increasing effectiveness of choice in 
elections (Schleiter and Voznaya 2014, 684). For that matter, strengthening the opposition 
is key for elections to contribute to the process of democratization (Rakner and van de 
Walle 2009, 108-109). On the contrary, the fractionalization of political parties, the lack of 
financial support and experience or the strong influence of ruling presidents are some of the 
reasons behind weakness of the opposition, which hinder the process of liberalizing 
electoral outcome (Teshome 2009, 1627; Ochieng’ Opalo, 2012, 82).  
 
Lastly, another aspect of opposition parties is their role in coordinating popular 
mobilization. Two different perspectives can be derived from literature. On the one hand, 
popular mobilization is not likely to lead to democratization because confronting unstable 
regimes could escalate into conflict. On the contrary, it is believed that social movements 
destabilize authoritarian regimes and therefore enhance political reforms, motivating people 
to participate in elections (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 140; Howard and Roessler 2006, 
372; LeBas 2011, 13-14). The incapability of the opposition to mobilize people is related to 
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the endurance of authoritarianism. For that matter, LeBas states that, “Political change is 
driven forward by popular mobilization” (2011, 8). For instance, elections in Côte d’Ivoire 
took place on time, according to the Constitution, while the country experienced high levels 
of popular mobilization towards political issues (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 141).  
 
These explanations lead to the following hypotheses: 
H1a: A high number of opposition parties decrease the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome 
H1b: Weakness of opposition decreases the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome.    
H1c: Popular mobilization increases the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome.   
 
 
b) Clientelistic practices  
Clientelism has been regarded as a common adverse practice in African states. Even in the 
case of Ghana, which has held five consecutive multiparty elections since 1992 and is 
considered a successful example of democratization, there have been patronage activities 
directed from the executive to the country’s Members of Parliament (Barkan, 2009, 148). 
However, some scholars challenge this idea by arguing that clientelism is not such a 
detrimental practice, and there are actually other variables affecting elections in African 
countries (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013). In this sense, Ochieng (2012) finds that the costs 
of patronage networks and clientelism practices for incumbents may even be higher than 
the benefits. And others state that activities like the payment of bribes could motivate 
political parties and enhance competition (Kalulu 2014, 512). 
 
Despite these ideas, it is more broadly believed that corruption is detrimental for democracy 
(Diamond 2008; Collier and Vicente 2012; Kalulu 2014). Corrupt governments are usually 
the cause of weak institutions. Benefits are maintained for the few so, instead of providing 
public goods, power is used for private gains, and this is reflected in elections (Diamond 
2008, 146). The so-called “politics of the belly” (Lynch 2011; Hino et al. 2012) link the 
existence of patronage networks with the incapability of competition to emerge and 
therefore create fair and free processes of democratization. Therefore, a high rate of 
corruption is likely to decrease the chances of liberalizing electoral outcome.  
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The incumbent’s time in power is another important factor in this category (Barkan 2009, 
2). Even though elections give citizens the chance to change leaders through elections, this 
is not always the case. Examples like Chad, where Idriss Deby has been re-elected 
throughout the years despite malpractices, show that elections do not always lead to 
turnovers. This is mainly because corruption leads to misinformation or vote buying, which 
is detrimental to democracy, and especially to the electoral process (Schleiter and Voznaya 
2014, 684). For that matter, “repetitions of elections that eventually (in many cases at least) 
lead to alternations in power indeed create democrats” (Lindberg, 2009, 37). In this sense, 
the number of turnovers is positively significant when alternation of power takes place, and 
therefore longer times in power are likely to decrease the chances of liberalizing electoral 
outcome (Lindberg 2006, 59).  
 
Lastly, foreign aid is also a relevant factor in this category because Africa is one of the 
biggest beneficiaries in terms of development aid and democracy assistance (Resnick and 
Van de Walle, 2013). Besides this, some donors specifically assigned aid to the 
improvement of electoral processes, thinking that it would lead to the liberalization of 
electoral outcome. However, some authors believe that it could have the opposite result and 
support authoritarian rule (Diamond 2008, 105-113). The cases of Mali and Benin illustrate 
this issue.  
 
In the case of Mali, foreign aid created dependence, further deteriorating some of the 
country’s weaknesses. In this sense, the state proved itself incapable of implementing 
proper development policy. It was unable to tackle inequality problems between elites and 
different groups of the population and corruption was a common practice (Resnick and Van 
de Walle 2013, 89-90). In the case of Benin, foreign aid is regarded as very positive. Since 
the beginning of the democratic transition in the 1990s, aid enhanced internal cohesion in 
both political and civil society, facilitating the process of democratization (Resnick and 
Van de Walle 2013, 232).  In this sense, more than 90% of the Beninese population declare 
that they can freely vote during elections (Resnick and Van de Walle 2013, 253).	   
 
As the cases of Mali and Benin show, the provision of foreign aid can have different 
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outcomes depending on the particular characteristics of states. Hence, it should be 
mentioned that, many factors like the level of cooperation between parties or the 
institutions available in a certain country, have to be taken into account. However, scholars 
believe that countries in the process of democratization that receive higher quantities of 
democracy aid decrease the likelihood of engaging in some kind of conflict  (Savun and 
Tirone 2011, 243). Similarly, democracy aid increases the likelihood of free and fairs 
elections by stabilising multiparty regimes, therefore reducing the likelihood of electoral 
misconduct (Dietrich and Wright 2014, 229-232). As a result, the chances of achieving 
political stability and liberalizing electoral outcome are higher.  
 
These explanations lead to the following hypotheses: 
H2a: Higher rate of corruption decreases the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome.  
H2b: Longer time in power decreases the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome. 
H2c: Higher levels of foreign aid increase the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome.    
 
 
c) Ethnicity and ethnic conflict  
The explanations regarding the different effects of ethnicity in Africa are very contested 
among the literature.  On the one hand, some scholars believe that the effect of ethnicity on 
voting behaviour and electoral outcome has been overestimated (Ferree et al. 2014). 
Cheeseman (2015, 655) makes use of the Kenyan case to analyse the importance of certain 
variables towards voting behaviour in the country to find that factors like education and 
social class have a greater impact than ethnicity. Therefore, even though ethnicity does 
matter, other factors have to be taken into account as well, and effect on elections and 
democracy varies form case to case (Basedau et al 2011, 464); ethnicity and democracy 
cannot be directly understood as mutually exclusive factors (Basedau et al 2011, 472). 
 
However, identity has also been regarded as a cause for division among political actors in 
African states (Horowitz 2014, 5; Morency-Laflamme 2015, 461). Horowitz believes that 
divided societies where ethnicity is a main component find it more difficult to reach 
democracy because parties and voting patterns depend on ethnic groups (Horowitz 2014, 
5). More specifically, ethnic differences are usually related to cultural division. These can 
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create inequality, marginalization and rivalry, and therefore political competition that might 
result in violent events and failure of past elections. Even though specific scenarios show 
that ethnicity is not necessarily a factor that restrains the process of democratization (like 
the case of Guinea, where ethnicity resulted in stability instead of unrest), they can explain 
the behaviour of certain groups in societies (Morency-Laflamme 2015, 461).  
 
Another important factor apart from ethnicity in this category is political ethnic relations. It 
is relevant because, if opposition groups are created based on ethnicity, volatility increases 
and prevents the creation of strong coalitions, making liberalizing electoral outcome more 
difficult (Weghorst, K. and Bernhard, M. 2014, 1712). Leaders use tactics like attacking, 
discrimination or exclusion of other parties that belong to different ethnic groups to prevent 
their effective participation in the elections or undermine their performance. As a result, 
conflict between ethnic groups arises (Cederman, Skrede and Hug 2012, 391). It is also 
worth noting that larger ethnic groups are more likely to engage in a conflict against the 
dominant party in government (Cederman, Skrede and Hug 2012, 395). Therefore, ethnic 
divided political parties are likely to decrease the chances of liberalizing electoral outcome.  
 
Lastly, ethnic conflict is also identified as a relevant factor in this category. Koter points 
out the reason for this when she states, “close electoral contests between ethnic parties raise 
the spectre of possible violence” (2013, 188). Therefore, the problem is that ethnic groups 
are more likely to engage in conflict at the time of elections in countries moving towards 
democracy, mainly because of the leader’s willingness to stay in power (Cederman, Skrede 
and Hug 2012, 390). For instance, in the elections in Côte d’Ivoire in 2010, disputes 
between the incumbent and the challenger leaders led to ethnic conflict.  
 
These explanations lead to the following hypotheses: 
H3a: Ethnic diversity decreases the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome. 
H3b: Political ethnic relations decrease the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome. 
H3c: High ethnic conflict decreases the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome.   
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d) Change in leadership 
The last category of factors related to the liberalization of electoral outcome is based on the 
fact that countries can experience changes in leadership for reasons other than elections. 
Different events like coups or the death of leaders are likely to cause a change in 
leadership, and therefore affect voting preferences and future elections. For instance, this is 
the case of the Central African Republic where, after democratic elections in 1993, there 
have been various changes in leadership through coups (Isaacs-Martin 2016, 26). Similarly, 
Guinea’s democratically elected president Lansana Conté peacefully died in office in 2008 
after several re-elections (Bah 2016, 299).  For that matter, scholars find important to focus 
on individual leaders and not just regime types and political parties because their personal 
characteristics before, during and after being in office can influence specific events 
(Goemans, Skrede and Chiozza 2009, 274).  
 
Goemans, Skrede and Chiozza find that leadership changes can take place in a regular 
manner, an irregular manner, through direct removal or because of natural death (2009, 
273). In this sense, regular manners include instances like elections, voluntary retirement or 
term limits. Term limits have been considered an important democratic driver in Africa 
(Maltz 2007; Ochieng 2012; Kiwuwa 2013). They mitigate clientelistic practices, allowing 
a regular alternation of power and therefore strengthening institutions (Kiwuwa 2013, 267).  
 
On the other hand, irregular forms include domestic popular protest, assassination or power 
struggle, among others. In the case of power struggles, it is believed that chances of 
dominant-party politics increase (Ishiyama 2014, 427). Hence, volatility during elections is 
harder to achieve and liberalizing electoral outcome is prevented. The same result derives 
from civil wars. Post-conflict elections are likely to be influenced by identity, ethnic, 
regional interests or the willingness to reach peace, therefore having an impact on vote 
choice (Batty 2015, 380).  
 
These explanations lead to the following hypotheses: 
H4a: Regular changes in leadership increase the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome.  
H4b: Irregular changes in leadership decrease the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome. 
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3. Method of analysis and research design 
For the purpose of this study, the hypotheses previously stated are tested with a fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA). QCA studies explicit complex connections, 
that is, whether a group of different combinations of causal conditions share the same 
outcome.  Therefore, the main aim of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) 
is to analyse complex causation to identify different combinations of conditions that 
produce a given outcome (Ragin 2008, 125). That is, which combination of conditions 
leads to liberalizing electoral outcome in the set of countries provided. 
 
It is worth noting that fuzzy sets are still at an early stage of research, while statistics are 
more mature (Colubi and Dubois 2011, 892). However, fuzzy set theory is considered more 
suitable for this study. It allows for empirical analysis but also makes use of qualitative 
knowledge and case analysis to find a connection between causal conditions and outcomes. 
The use of qualitative knowledge becomes particularly important because it enables to draw 
a distinction between relevant and irrelevant information (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 92). 
This information is later used to compute the so-called degree of membership, which 
assesses the extent to which cases belong to some specific set (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 90). 
It is worth mentioning that the use of qualitative knowledge distinguishes fs/QCA from 
correlational causation (Ragin 2008, 15).  
 
Furthermore, this study is composed of a relatively small number of cases to evaluate, 
which makes fs/QCA analysis more appropriate. A limited number of cases allows for a 
deeper understanding of each case, increasing accuracy of information and mitigating error. 
Therefore, a higher consistency threshold (which is later explained) can be used, obtaining 
more precise results (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 107). In-depth case analysis also increases 
transparency of the study because it provides details regarding membership scores and a 
concrete conceptualization of variables (Legewie 2013, 16).   
In terms of fuzzy sets, they are used when the level or degree of the variable under study 
varies. For example, when studying the level of democracy in a set of cases, not every 
country will be either democratic or non-democratic, but there will be in-between cases 
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(Ragin 2008, 29). Hence, the degree of membership is calculated to be included in a range 
between 0.0 and 1.0. To make this possible, both substantive and theoretical knowledge are 
necessary. Knowledge, which is based on external criteria, enables calibration of fuzzy sets, 
that is, the transformation of variables into a degree of membership. For that matter, this 
approach connects theoretical discourses together with empirical analysis (Ragin 2008, 84). 
In our case concerning, fuzzy-sets will be divided into six categories attached to six values 
ranging from 0 to 1, as shown in Table 1. 
    
Table 1. Membership Scores for six-value fuzzy set 
Membership Score Definition 
1 Full membership 
0.8 Mostly in 
0.6 More in than out 
0.4 More out than in 
0.2 Mostly out 
0 Full non-membership 
 
Therefore, fs/QCA is an appropriate approach because it considers all logically possible 
combinations of conditions. It includes qualitative analysis based on the literature of cases 
involved as well as quantitative proof, which increases accuracy and transparency. Besides, 
this study includes a relatively small number of cases, which allows for an in-depth 
research of every case and also increases the accuracy of results.   
 
3.1 Scope of study 
This study is focused on liberalizing electoral outcome in Africa, particularly in 
Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, in the event of presidential elections. Hence, it uses 
scope conditions to determine the set of cases to analyse. Scope conditions are particular 
requirements or characteristics that all cases included in the model must meet. The main 
aim of scope conditions is to “limit the applicability of the relationship proposed in a 
hypothesis”, and it is expected that hypotheses will be valid under these characteristics 
(Foschi 1997, 540). Therefore, scope conditions narrow down the number of cases and 
specify the information that is related to the hypotheses under study.    
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The first scope condition is related to the colonial power ruling African states since the end 
of the Second World War until the year of decolonization (1945-1960). The choice is based 
on the fact that some authors have appealed to historical ties as a determinant for 
democratic pace (Basedau 2011; Weghorst and Bernhard 2014). In this sense, Francophone 
colonies are considered the most volatile, because elections before independence were not 
hold regularly and were usually centralised in France. In fact, newly independent states 
arising from Francophone colonies were administrative and authoritarian, with a lack of 
democratic tradition (Chafer 2002, 226-233). On the other hand, British colonies are 
considered less volatile because before independence electoral assemblies already existed. 
Therefore, the more independent a government, the less volatile it is (Weghorst and 
Bernhard 2014, 1712-1724). 
 
The second scope condition is based on the difference between presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Scholars have used this dichotomy to analyse the electoral 
outcomes in African states (Lindberg 2009; Barkan 2009). In fact, it is necessary to bear in 
mind that both play a relevant role in Africa: from 1989 until 2007, 120 presidential 
elections and 137 parliamentary elections were held (Lindberg 2009, 203-205). However, 
the case concerning considers presidential elections due to the specific approach that 
French leaders used to rule African colonies, based on a centralized decision-making. 
Because self-governance was not encouraged, it was not until the end of the 20th century 
that Parliaments started to put into practice core functions (Barkan 2009, 12). Therefore, the 
underdevelopment of legislatures makes them less suitable for the purpose of this particular 
case. On the contrary, governments in Francophone states have been present, despite 
instability, since independence. Therefore, presidential elections are a more developed 
institution in French former colonies.  
 
Even though both distinctions could be introduced in the model as independent variables, 
they are used as scope conditions to limit applicability and focus the study into a more 
specific goal. It is expected that this will enable a better understanding of the process of 
liberalizing electoral outcome in the 10 cases concerning this study: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
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Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger 
and Senegal. 
 
The time period under consideration is the years ranging from 1990 to 2010. The end of the 
Cold War is the tipping point when multiparty elections are introduced in African countries. 
Besides this, a time frame of twenty years is regarded as suitable for this work, taking into 
account the fs/QCA method used. It allows for three or four elections, depending on the 
country, where variables and changes throughout the years can be properly analysed.  
 
3.2 Variables 
The four categories discussed in the literature review explain the relationship between 
liberalizing electoral outcome and factors that have been identified as the most relevant in 
the democratization process. The following section describes the variables chosen for each 
category to be included in the model.  
 
Firstly, liberalizing electoral outcome (LEO) serves as the dependent variable, or the so-
called outcome, in the model. Even though liberalizing electoral outcome does not 
necessarily mean that competitive authoritarian regimes will become democratic, it is 
observed as an important step towards it. Besides, it is related to the improvement of free 
and fair elections (Howard and Roessler 2006, 369). For this matter, this study uses the 
Political Rights Index created by Freedom House. Cases are coded as liberalizing electoral 
outcome when score decreases by one or more points in the year of elections, compared to 
the previous year1. It also takes into account the literature provided by the Freedom House 
regarding freedom and fairness of elections. Table 1 divides presidential elections (1990-
2010) of the francophone states mentioned above into those that led or did not lead to 
liberalising electoral outcome. The sample is composed of 36 cases, of which 10 have a 
positive outcome and 26 have a negative outcome.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In the Political Rights scale, 1 represents the highest level of freedom and 7 the lowest.  
2 Yearly Democracy Index created by the Economist Intelligence Unit (The Economist). Available at:  
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Table 2: Presidential Elections and Outcome in ten Francophone African Countries 
Presidential elections and outcome N=36 
Liberalising electoral outcome N=10 Non-liberalising electoral outcome N=26 
• Benin (1991) 
• Central African Republic (1993, 2005) 
• Republic of Congo (1992) 
• Guinea (2010) 
• Mali (1992) 
• Niger (1993, 1999, 2004) 
• Senegal (2000) 
• Benin (1996, 2001, 2006) 
• Burkina Faso (1991, 1998, 2005, 2010) 
• Central African Republic (1999) 
• Chad (1996, 2001, 2006) 
• Republic of Congo (2002, 2009) 
• Côte d’Ivoire (1990, 1995, 2000, 2010) 
• Guinea (1993, 1998, 2003) 
• Mali (1997, 2002, 2007) 
• Niger (1996) 
• Senegal (1993, 2007) 
 
Following the presentation of the dependent variable, the independent variables (also called 
causal conditions for the purpose of the fs/QCA model) are explained, taking into account 
the four categories developed along the literature review and the hypothesis stated. Also, 
Table 3 summarises the list of the independent variables:  
 
a) Variables based on opposition and competition  
In order to evaluate the hypotheses stated regarding the first relevant category, the main 
variables identified are the i) high rate of opposition, ii) weakness of opposition and iii) 
political mobilization.  
 
The high rate of opposition parties is measured considering the number of parties 
participating in the elections held during the time period. In order to calibrate this variable, 
The African Elections Database (2012) and an in-depth qualitative analysis of the number 
of parties allowed in elections are used for this purpose. It is worth mentioning that this 
variable also includes leaders who take part in elections as independent candidates.   
 
The weakness of opposition parties is measured through a combination of components, 
including the small size of opposition parties, the existence of independent candidates, and 
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the percentage of seats in parliament represented by the opposition (Rakner and Van der 
Walle 2009, 110-111).  These are parties that find it difficult to create strong bonds and 
effectively represent the interests of the people (LeBas 2011, 23). In depth qualitative 
research is appropriate for the investigation on these variables in the cases selected, where 1 
represents the weakest countries and 0 stands for the least weak countries. 
 
Political mobilization is measured according to an in depth qualitative analysis of the 
groups of people that got involved in some kind of action to defend common interests (Gurr 
1993, 169). The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (Raleigh, Linke, Hegre 
and Karlsen 2010) also provides information on political protests carried out in the cases 
concerning. 
 
b) Variables based on clientelistic practices  
In order to measure the possible effect of clientelism on liberalizing electoral outcome, 
three are the most appropriate variables to take into account: i) high rate of corruption, ii) 
long time in power and iii) high levels of foreign aid.  
 
The high rate of corruption is measured taking into account the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators database (2017b), as well as an in-depth study of the cases. It is worth stating 
that the World Bank defines corruption as, “perceptions of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (World Bank, 2017).  
 
The long time in power variable is measured by an in-depth country-based qualitative 
research taking into account the time that ruling coalitions spend in power. The African 
Elections Database (2012) also provides information. According to the hypothesis stated 
above, the longer the time a government spends in power, the less likely is to liberalize 
electoral outcome. Therefore, a score of 0 represents countries where leaders spend less 
time in power, while a score of 1 represents countries where leaders spend longer periods of 
time ruling.  
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The high level of foreign aid is measured considering the World Bank Development 
Indicators database (2017), which evaluates “net official development assistance and 
official aid received in US$”. Even though foreign aid can be provided in different forms, 
including technical assistance (Gibson, Hoffman and Jablonski 2015), economic or 
democracy aid (Dietrich and Wright 2013), foreign aid as a whole is considered in this 
study.  
 
c) Variables based on ethnicity and ethnic conflict   
The different hypotheses explaining the role of ethnicity in liberalizing electoral outcome 
will be explained through the following variables: i) high ethnic diversity, ii) political 
ethnic relations and iii) high ethnic conflict.  
 
High ethnic diversity is measured by a qualitative in-depth research conducted for the 
countries selected. For a more precise decision on measurement scores, the PREG 
(Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups) index developed by Daniel Posner (2004), together 
with Fearon (2003), Alesina et al. (2003) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) ethnic 
fractionalization datasets are used. Even though there is not a consensual definition of 
deeply divided societies, for the purpose of this study this term is used “when a large 
number of conflict group members attach overwhelming importance to the issues at stake, 
or manifest strongly held antagonistic beliefs and emotions toward the opposing segment, 
or both” (Nordlinger 1972, in Bah 2016). 
 
The political ethnic relations variable is measured considering the Ethnic Power Relations 
(EPR) database (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009), as well as qualitative knowledge 
acquired through an in-depth study of cases. This variable identifies ethnic groups that are 
politically relevant for the country as well as their chances to access state power.  
 
The high ethnic conflict variable is measured considering the Ethnic Armed Conflict (EAC) 
database, integrated in the EPR database (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009).  For this 
purpose, ethnic conflict is defined as follow: “conflicts over ethnonational self-
determination, the ethnic balance of power in government, ethnoregional autonomy, ethnic 
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and racial discrimination (whether alleged or real), and language and other cultural rights” 
(Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009).    
 
d) Variables based on changes in leadership  
In order to evaluate the effect of changes in leadership on elections, two different variables 
are used: i) regular change in leadership and ii) irregular change in leadership.  
 
As previously stated, a regular change in leadership can take place because of elections, 
voluntary retirement or term limits. Considering elections, the relationship between the 
variable and the outcome can be perceived as tautological because every time there is a 
regular change in power there are elections taking place as well. For that matter, it is not 
considered in this study. Besides, there is no case of voluntary retirement in the cases 
selected. Therefore, the variable considering regular change takes into account the 
possibility of a leadership change planned before elections because of the existence of term 
limits. Scores are assigned through a qualitative in-depth research conducted for the 
countries selected.  
 
On the other hand, irregular change in leadership is measured considering the Archigos 
Dataset of Political Leaders (Goemans, Skrede and Chiozza 2009). Irregular forms include 
domestic popular protest, assassination or power struggle among others. It should be 
mentioned that natural death, which is considered as a third possibility in Archigos Dataset 
is not taken into account in this work. Membership score of 0 is assigned to countries where 
these variables are less significant. Similarly, a membership score of 1 is given to countries 
where regular or irregular changes in leadership are the most significant.  
 
The variables put forward are selected taking into account the recent literature available on 
the matter. Although there are many other factors that might affect elections, especially in 
African countries where democracy is still not settled and instability rules, these have been 
considered the most relevant for the cases concerning. It is worth stating that data 
availability and truthfulness are real issues when studying Africa. However, using the most 
reliable and complete sources was a main concern in the process.  
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Table 3: Independent Variables under each Category 
Variable name Category 
High rate of opposition a) Opposition and competition 
Weakness of opposition a) Opposition and competition 
 High Political Mobilization a) Opposition and competition 
High rate of corruption b) Clientelism 
Long time in power b) Clientelism 
High level of foreign aid b) Clientelism 
High ethnic diversity c) Ethnicity 
Political ethnic relations c) Ethnicity 
High ethnic conflict c) Ethnicity 
Regular leadership change d) Change in leadership 
Irregular leadership change d) Change in leadership 
 
 
In sum, this section has presented the methodology used in this study in order to prove the 
hypotheses previously stated. The fs/QCA model has been considered the most appropriate 
for the case because it considers all logically possible combinations of conditions in a 
quantitative and qualitative approach, which allows for a deep case-oriented research. 
Afterwards, scope conditions have been established: presidential elections in ten different 
francophone states from 1990 to 2010, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Senegal. The 
reason behind is that francophone states are considered more volatile because of specific 
features of French colonies (Chafer 2002, 226-233). Presidential elections are more 
important since the “persistence of presidentialism” is a barrier for the democratization of 
states (Lindberg 2009, 215; Lynch 2011, 284). Finally, liberalizing electoral outcome has 
been presented as the dependent variable or outcome, together with the independent 
variables or causal conditions to take into account in the fs/QCA model.  
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4. Analysis of empirical results and discussion 
The following section presents the analysis and the results of the application of the fs/QCA 
model. Firstly, it is worth stating that, in order to proceed with the empirical analysis, the 
variables or causal conditions explained in the preceding section have been calibrated using 
empirical evidence. This means that qualitative variables were translated into numerical 
data for each country considered. This numerical data is called membership scores, which 
measure the degree of membership mentioned above and allows for the fs/QCA model to 
be applied. The translation was conducted through an in-depth research of the cases and the 
use of indexes, datasets and other statistics available. The membership scores for every 
country and variable are presented and further explained in the Appendix, which includes 
evidence and explanations for all the ten cases concerning.  
 
The software used in the process is the fs/QCA Version 3.0 (Ragin and Davey 2014).  
Necessary conditions are determined in the first place for a deeper understanding of causal 
conditions. Afterwards, sufficient conditions are analysed through a Truth Table Algorithm. 
Finally, thresholds are considered and findings enable the confirmation or rejection of 
hypothesis stated in the Literature Review section.  
 
4.1 Necessary conditions 
The first step in the application of the fs/QCA model is the analysis of both the outcome 
and causal conditions to determine necessary conditions. Conditions are established as 
necessary when they must be present for the outcome to happen. Therefore, it identifies 
commonalities of a shared outcome. As Ragin poses it, “if a theoretically relevant causal 
condition is necessary, then it is present in all instance of an outcome” (2000, 203). 
Arithmetically, necessary conditions exist when membership scores of the outcome are less 
than or equal than membership scores of the causal conditions (Ragin 2000, 272). 
 
When causal conditions are tested for necessary conditions, consistency and coverage rates 
are computed. On the one hand, consistency measures the degree to which cases that share 
the same causal conditions display the same outcome. That is, to what extent there is a 
perfect subset relation (Ragin 2008, 44). The closer the consistency score is to 1, the more 
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perfect is the subset relation considered. On the other hand, coverage measures the degree 
to which a subset physically covers a larger set, so it gauges the relevance of the necessary 
condition. In this sense, the higher the coverage the higher the significance of the necessary 
condition or, similarly, a very low coverage represents a reasonable irrelevant necessary 
condition (Ragin 2008, 61). Nevertheless, high consistency does not necessary mean high 
coverage. So, taking this into account, coverage should be calculated after consistency has 
been determined (Ragin 2008, 55).   
 
In terms of results, while consistency should be fairly high (>0.9), coverage should be just 
not too low (>0.5). However, necessary conditions are not commonly found empirically, 
they are rare in real cases (Legewie 2013, 62). In fact, no obvious necessary conditions 
derive from this particular analysis. However, if a >0.75 consistency is considered, the 
causal condition of high ethnic diversity is relevant for the outcome (Table 4).  
 
Thus, the variable regarding ethnic diversity (ETHDIVERS) is a relevant causal condition 
for liberalizing electoral outcome. Contrary to the hypothesis H3a, which states that ethnic 
diversity decreases the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome, this test shows that high 
ethnic diversity increases it. A consistency value of 0.769231 in the test for necessary 
conditions supports the argument. The case of Central African Republic proves this fact. 
The country, which is considered one of the most ethnically diverse states among cases 
under study (Alesina et al. 2003, 185; Fearon 2003, 218), experienced two elections 
considered as liberalizing electoral outcome from 1990 to 2010 (Table 2).  
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Table 4: test results for necessary conditions  
Causal Condition Consistency Coverage 
High rate of opposition 0.653846 0.680000 
Weakness of opposition 0.615385 0.615385 
High political mobilization 0.653846 0.653846 
High level of corruption 0.692308 0.692308 
Time in power 0.576923 0.517241 
High level of foreign aid 0.653856 0.653846 
High ethnic diversity 0.769231 0.689655 
Ethnic political relations 0.500000 0.590909 
High armed conflict 0.576923 0.750000 
Regular regime change 0.692308 0.720000 
Irregular regime change 0.500000 0.565217 
∼ High rate of opposition 0.615385 0.640000 
∼ Weakness of opposition 0.692308 0.750000 
∼ High political mobilization 0.576923 0.625000 
∼ High level of corruption 0.576923 0.625000 
∼ Time in power 0.730769 0.904762 
∼ High level of foreign aid 0.576923 0.625000 
∼ High ethnic diversity 0.500000 0.619048 
∼ Ethnic political relations 0.692398 0.642857 
∼ High armed conflict 0.730769 0.633333 
∼ Regular regime change 0.461538 0.444445 
∼ Irregular regime change 0.653846 0.629630 
Outcome variable: liberalizing electoral outcome.  
The symbol (∼) stands for negation or absence of a given factor. 
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4.2 Truth table analysis for sufficient conditions  
The second step to consider in the process is the identification of sufficient conditions. For 
this purpose a truth table analysis is conducted through the application of a truth table 
algorithm. Once necessary conditions are effectively established as necessary, they can be 
excluded from the truth table analysis. This seems obvious because a condition that is 
necessary, it is part of every combination of conditions, so it is also sufficient. However, 
since they might still be part of the combination of sufficient conditions, both tests include 
necessary conditions for a better understanding  (Ragin 2008b, 43).  
  
Similarly to the case of necessary conditions, the analysis of sufficient conditions looks for 
possible subset relationships between the outcome and causal conditions. Furthermore, 
conditions are sufficient if they can produce an outcome by themselves (Ragin 2008b, 43). 
However, contrary to the case of necessary conditions, subset relationships exist when 
membership score of causal condition is less than or equal than membership score of the 
outcome (Ragin 2000, 278).  
 
When constructing a truth table it is necessary to select frequency and consistency 
thresholds, which enables the preparation of the truth tables to obtain numerical results and 
analyse them. The frequency threshold is used to evaluate which combinations of 
conditions are relevant. In other words, it reveals the number of combinations with more 
than a 0.5 membership (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 107). When number of cases selected is 
considered small, frequency threshold should be low as well (Ragin 2008b, 46). This study 
analyses 36 cases (N=36 as shown in Table 2), which is a relatively small number of cases 
and therefore, frequency threshold is 1.  
 
In terms of the consistency threshold, a so-called cut-off value needs to be determined in 
order to evaluate which causal conditions satisfy this threshold. In this sense, those causal 
combinations with consistency scores higher than the cut-off value are considered fuzzy 
subsets. This means that the higher the cut-off value, the more restrained results will be, 
since number of cases is reduced. Besides this, in order to prove consistency, cut-off value 
should be equal or higher than 0.75, otherwise results are likely to be inconsistent (Rihoux 
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and Ragin 2009, 121).  It is possible to apply more than one threshold to the truth table, so 
that outcomes can be compared (Ragin 2008b, 47). Consistency results obtained in the truth 
table are taken into account for the selection of the cut-off values. In the case concerning, 
results with a 0.8 cut-off value are obtained.  
 
At the time of building up truth table results, complex, parsimonious and intermediate 
solutions can be obtained. Even though they are all logical and none contain misleading 
information, some authors believe that parsimonious solutions are a simplification, because 
causal recipes are reduced to the smallest possible number of conditions. Therefore they use 
intermediate solutions for the analysis of truth tables (Legewie 2013, 45; Ragin 2008, 175). 
However, others prefer to rely on parsimonious solutions because it shows a greater 
connection with causality. In this sense, Baumgartner states that intermediate solutions are 
not the best approach when testing causal hypothesis or interpreting causality but 
parsimonious solutions are (2015, 840). Furthermore, the parsimonious solution usually 
implies the intermediate and other more conservative solutions. Therefore, parsimonious 
solutions have been considered the most appropriate for the analysis.   
 
The truth table results show a list of paths (also called causal recipes), which are different 
combinations of sufficient conditions that lead to the same outcome. There are several 
concepts to take into consideration among the results obtained. Firstly, raw coverage 
measures the extent to which the outcome is explained by each recipe. In this sense, the 
higher the values the more empirically relevant the combination is. Since some 
combinations to the outcome overlap, unique coverage measures the proportion of cases 
represented exclusively by one certain recipe. Although this measurement is not as 
important as raw coverage, it is worth mentioning that those recipes with higher unique 
coverage are considered more relevant (Legewie 2013, 65-67). Finally, solution 
consistency and solution coverage measure the complete consistency and coverage values 
of the whole truth table result. 
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4.3 Discussion 
The discussion of results is presented in four parts, according to the four different 
categories of cases explained in the Literature Review and the Method sections. A 
minimum raw coverage of >0.5 was necessary for causal recipes to be regarded as 
significant. Besides, truth table analysis across different categories was also conducted but 
there were no significant results. Relevant results are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Parsimonious solution for sufficient conditions at >0.8 consistency cutoff value per 
category  
Causal recipes Raw Coverage Unique Coverage  Consistency 
a) Opposition and competition 
∼RATEOPP*POLMOB 
∼WEAKOPP*∼POLMOB 
 
0.576923 0.346154 0.789474 
0.423077 0.192308 0.916667 
b) Clientelistic practices 
∼TIMEPOW 
   
0.730769 0.730769 0.904762 
c) Ethnicity and ethnic conflict 
ETHDIVERS*∼ARMCONF 
∼POLRELAT*ARMCONF 
∼ETHDIVERS*ARMCONF 
 
0.653846 0.346154 0.85 
0.423077 0 0.916667 
0.384615 0.0384615 0.909091 
d) Changes in leadership 
REGCHAN*∼IRREGCHAN 
 
0.461538 0.461538 0.8 
The symbol (∼) stands for negation or absence of a given factor. 
The symbol (*) stands for “conjunction”. 
 
 
• Category a) 
The first category of variables include i) high rate of opposition parties, ii) weakness of 
opposition and iii) high political mobilization. The observable implications recalled that a 
high rate of opposition parties and weakness of opposition decrease the likelihood of 
liberalizing electoral outcome (H1a and H1b), while high rate of political mobilization 
increases it (H1c).  
 
When analysed through a truth table, there is one path of causal conditions that can be 
considered significant. The conjunction of not-high rate of opposition and political 
mobilization (∼RATEOPP*POLMOB) confirm H1a and H1c: the hypotheses that a high rate 
of opposition parties decreases the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome (and 
therefore a low rate of opposition parties increases it) and high popular political 
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mobilization increases the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome are supported. The 
case of Niger illustrates this. Even though the rate of opposition parties was low during the 
time period, participation was constant. Besides this, a broad range of trade unions led 
weighty mass mobilizations, mainly at the beginning of the transition to a multiparty 
system (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 148). Thus, the raw coverage of the causal 
combination is 0.576923, which means that this combination explains almost 60% of the 
cases under analysis. 
 
The second path in the parsimonious solution for category a) variables represents the 
conjunction of not-high rate of weak opposition and not-high political mobilization 
(∼WEAOPP*∼POLMOB). It refers to strong opposition together with a lack of political 
mobilization.  However is not considered very significant due to a raw coverage of 
0.423077, which only explains around 42% of cases. 
 
These ideas raise doubts on whether electoral contestation is actually necessary for African 
states to liberalize electoral outcome. Nevertheless, reality shows that even those 
considered stable democratic systems in Sub-Saharan Africa suffer weakness in opposition 
parties. Indeed, Rakner and van de Walle, (2009, 109) only find a minor relationship 
between strength of the opposition and the quality of electoral competition. This idea is 
portrayed by examples like Mali. Even though electoral competition is considered fairly 
weak in the country, elections in 1992 are regarded as liberalizing electoral outcome (Table 
2). Besides this, the country has maintained low scores in the Political Rights index since 
then. For that matter, taking into account results and this latter evidence, weakness of 
opposition is not a sufficiently relevant variable to understand the concept of liberalizing 
electoral outcome in the context under study, and H1b cannot be properly explained.  
 
Therefore, hypothesis H1a and H1c are supported by the analysis, but there is not enough 
evidence to prove H1b, which is rejected. While high rate of opposition parties decreases the 
likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome, high political mobilization increases it.  The 
role of weakness of opposition proves irrelevant.  
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• Category b) 
The second category of variables include i) high rate of corruption, ii) long time in power 
and iii) high levels of foreign aid. The observable implications recalled that, while high rate 
of corruption decreases the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome, both long time in 
power and high levels of foreign aid increase it.  
 
When analysed through a truth table, there is one path of causal conditions that can be 
considered significant, which is not-long time in power (∼TIMEPOW). Therefore, H2b 
stating that long time in power decreases the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome is 
strongly supported. Benin and Niger serve as examples that prove this fact. Both countries 
experienced multiple turnovers from 1990 to 2010 and some elections have been regarded 
as liberalizing electoral outcome, as shown in Table 2. Thus, the raw coverage of the causal 
combination is 0.730769. This means that not-high time in power explains more than 73% 
of the cases leading to liberalizing electoral outcome. Solution coverage and solution 
consistency are also significant (0.730769 and 0.904762, respectively).  
 
If a truth table analysis is constructed taking not-liberalizing electoral outcome as the 
outcome, there are two paths that can be considered significant. Firstly, the conjunction of 
high rate of corruption and long time in power is a causal recipe for not-liberalizing 
electoral outcome (CORRUPTION*TIMEPOW). This provides support for H2a, stating that 
corruption decreases the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome and further 
corroborates the relevance of H2b. Secondly, the conjunction of long time in power and high 
levels of foreign aid also lead to not-liberalizing electoral outcome (TIMEPOW*FORAID). 
In this case, hypothesis H2c is not supported. Instead, the analysis shows that high levels of 
foreign aid are likely to decrease the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome. Burkina 
Faso serves as an example: despite high levels of foreign aid injected in the country (World 
Bank 2017), the dominance of Campaoré in power along the time period considered has 
prevented the holding of elections liberalizing electoral outcome (Table 2). Thus, these two 
paths have a 0.583333 raw coverage, meaning that both combinations explain almost 60% 
of the cases. 
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Therefore, hypothesis H2a and H2b are supported by this analysis, but H2c is not. In this 
sense, high rate of corruption, long time in power and foreign aid all show to decrease 
likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome.   
 
• Category c) 
The following category of variables includes i) high ethnic diversity, ii) high political 
ethnic relations and iii) high rate of armed conflict. The observable implications recalled 
that all three variables lead to a decrease in the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome. 
 
When analysed through a truth table, there is one path of causal conditions that can be 
considered significant, which is the conjunction of ethnic diversity and not-high rate of 
armed conflict (ETHDIVERS*∼ARMCONF). Regarding the variable of ethnic diversity, 
this is related to the study of necessary conditions where, contrary to the hypothesis H3a, 
high ethnic diversity shows to be significant at liberalizing electoral outcome. However, 
hypothesis H3c is confirmed because a not-high rate of armed conflict leads to liberalizing 
electoral outcome, and therefore a high rate of armed conflict decreases the likelihood of 
liberalizing electoral outcome. Thus, this causal combination shows a raw coverage of 
0.653846, meaning that it explains more than 65% of the cases.  
 
In this case, Benin also serves as an example. Despite a fairly high level of ethnic diversity, 
the country is coded with the lowest membership score in terms of ethnic conflict. The 
country was able to liberalize electoral outcome in 1991 and has maintained low scores in 
the Political Rights index, this meaning high levels of freedom (Freedom House 2017).  
 
In terms of political ethnic relations, there is no causal recipe that includes the variable to 
lead to liberalizing electoral outcome or not-liberalizing electoral outcome. For that matter, 
political ethnic relations variable is not considered a sufficiently relevant condition to 
explain the liberalization of electoral outcome in the cases under consideration.  
 
Therefore, only H3c is supported which states that high rate of armed conflict decreases the 
likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome. On the contrary, H3a is not supported because 
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high ethnic diversity proves to increase the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome. 
Political ethnic relations in H3b do not show are sufficiently relevant.  
 
• Category d) 
The last category of variables includes i) regular change in leadership and ii) irregular 
change in leadership. While hypothesis H4a stated that regular regime changes increase the 
likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome, hypothesis H4b recalls that irregular regime 
change decreases its likelihood.  
 
When analysed through a truth table, there is one path of causal conditions that can be 
considered significant, which is the conjunction of a regular leadership change and the 
absence of an irregular change in leadership (REGCHAN*∼IRREGCHAN). This supports 
both H4a and H4b, and establishes that regular regimes changes based on term limits and the 
lack of irregular regimes changes (for instance, the occurrence of a coup) are likely to 
liberalize electoral outcome. However, this causal combination cannot be considered very 
significant because raw coverage is 0.461538, so it explains less than 50% of the cases 
considered.  Therefore, results do not strongly support hypotheses H4a and H4b and they 
cannot be considered very relevant for the conclusion of this study.  
 
This section was intended to further explain the fs/QCA method used to test the 
relationship between causal conditions and the outcome. It presented the two main steps in 
the process, which include the test for necessary conditions and the test for sufficient 
conditions through truth tables. Afterwards, the main causal recipes that proved to be 
relevant were portrayed, showing the main results of the analysis. Thereby, it can be 
concluded that high political mobilization and high ethnic diversity increase the likelihood 
of liberalizing electoral outcome. On the contrary, high rate of opposition parties, long time 
in power, corruption, high rate of foreign aid and high rate of armed conflict decrease the 
likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome. Finally, weakness of opposition, political 
ethnic relations and regular and irregular change in leadership are not sufficiently 
significant for the analysis of this outcome.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
The present study has analysed the relationship between liberalizing electoral outcome and 
different causal conditions. The purpose was to determine the reasons why some African 
countries were able to liberalize electoral outcome from 1990 until 2010 and others have 
not. The fs/QCA approach was considered the most appropriate because it conducts 
empirical analysis but also makes use of qualitative knowledge and in-depth case analysis.  
 
The results obtained supported some of the hypotheses stated, while other hypotheses were 
rejected. However, the main conclusions extracted from the analysis imply that high 
political mobilization and high ethnic diversity are variables increasing the likelihood of 
liberalizing electoral outcome. This is further illustrated by examples like Niger, where 
mass mobilizations were able to make a change at the beginning of the transition period to 
multiparty regime (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 148). Similarly, Benin’s high ethnic 
diversity, lack of armed conflict and high rate of turnovers (allowed by short periods of 
time of leaders in power) explain the holding of free and fair elections in the time period 
considered.  
 
On the contrary, high levels of corruption and foreign aid, as well as long terms in office 
decrease the likelihood of liberalizing electoral outcome. In fact, Burkina Faso, which 
experienced all of these, did not hold any liberalizing electoral outcome elections from 
1990 to 2010 (Table 1).  Besides this, high rate of opposition parties and high rate of armed 
conflict are also likely to affect liberalizing electoral outcome negatively. Also, weakness 
of opposition, political ethnic relations and regular and irregular change in leadership are 
not sufficiently significant in their relationship with the outcome.  
 
It is important to point out some limitations as well as suggestions for future research, 
according to this study. Firstly, this study has analysed 11 variables to understand their 
relationship with the liberalization of electoral outcome. They were chosen taking into 
account the most recent literature, and were considered relevant for the topic. However, 
there are other variables that could have an effect on the process of holding elections. For 
instance, the economic conditions of a country could shape voting behaviour and therefore 
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affect elections (Bratton et al. 2012). The role of economic crisis or higher levels of GDP 
can be then analysed with respect to liberalizing electoral outcome. Similarly, Cheeseman 
(2015) finds that education or the existence of a middle class can also be relevant in the 
process of democratization of African states. Therefore they could also be significant 
variables affecting liberalizing electoral outcome.   
 
Even though a small-N condition is suitable for in-depth case analysis in the fs/QCA 
approach, it also has limitations when using conclusions for broader generalizations. For 
that matter, N could be increased to include not only francophone but also Anglophone 
African states sharing certain characteristics. In this way, a comparative study would be 
allowed and results would be applicable to a wider range of countries.  
 
Lastly, the relationship between liberalising electoral outcome and the level of 
democratization in African countries should be analysed. As it has been stated before, the 
role of elections has been regarded as relevant in enhancing democracy in developing 
countries (Lindberg 2009, 45; Lynch 2011, 279). However, some of the cases studied in 
this work show that, despite elections being free and fair, the countries did not attain the 
level of democracy expected. For instance, despite the consideration of some elections in 
Central African Republic as free and fair, the country scored 162 out of 167 countries in the 
Democracy Index in 20102.  
 
The conclusions extracted from this study together with the suggestions for further research 
should enable a better understanding of elections in Africa, as well as their relationship to 
the process of democratization. Furthermore, it could provide with the basis for policy 
recommendation and implementation, which could foster the establishment of democracy 
among African states.  
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Yearly Democracy Index created by the Economist Intelligence Unit (The Economist). Available at:  
https://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf 
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7. Appendix  
Appendix 1: Country Report 
The following section includes information regarding the membership score given to the 
variables studied for each country. The purpose is to provide a more detailed explanation to 
facilitate the understanding on the decisions made during the implementation of the fs/QCA 
model. Table 6 included at the end of this appendix provides membership scores of all 
countries. 
 
Benin 
A membership score of 1 is given to Benin in terms of the rate of opposition, because a 
great variety of opposition parties have been able to participate in elections since 1991. In 
this sense, in the elections of 2006 up to 26 different parties participated, as established in 
the African Elections Database	   (2012). Opposition parties are not considered very strong 
(Rakner and van de Walle 2009, 110). Even though seats are shared among some parties, 
others are barely represented so smaller parties are insignificant in parliament. Besides this, 
there are many independent candidates during elections, a fact that is considered to weaken 
opposition (Rakner and Van der Walle 2009, 111). However, they are not the weakest 
among the cases considered, so 0.4 membership score is given. In terms of political 
mobilization, the ACLED Data	  (Raleigh, Linke, Hegre and Karlsen 2010) does not show a 
vast number of political protests compared to the other cases. Still, some Beninese 
associations like trade unions are regarded as strong and influencing and therefore a 0.4 
membership score is also given (Gisselquist 2008, 803).   
 
Benin has a considerable level of corruption according to figures presented by World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2017b). Some of the common 
practices include the resolution of conflicts through private means and the low wages of 
public officials, which leads to unofficial payments and bribery (Bierschenk 2008, 123-
131). Regarding term limits, Benin scores almost the lowest. The Constitutional changes 
implemented in 1990 included term and age limits for candidates. These measures were 
meant to move older candidates that ruled before multiparty system was established, and 
allow for turnovers to protect the country from becoming a one-party state again 
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(Gisselquist 2008, 797). Besides this, it is worth stating that, despite the fact that foreign aid 
is not the highest among countries under study, there were important donations, mainly 
from 1991 to 1996 during Soglo’s mandate, that improved the country’s feelings towards 
democracy. However, even though this factor must be considered, it is not a main factor 
alone (Gisselquist 2008, 801).   
 
Benin is considered a plural society where ethnic groups live together. In this sense, 
Posner’s PREG analysis (2004, 861) shows a constant level of politically relevant ethnic 
groups which, compared to the other cases concerning, can be considered fairly high. The 
same conclusion can be extracted from Alesina et al. (2003, 184). In terms of EPR, Benin 
was given the lowest possible (0) score because of the constant power sharing without any 
kind of ethnic exclusion. The same score was assigned to EAC due to the inexistence of 
relevant ethnic conflict during the time period studied (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009). 
Finally, no irregular change in leadership took place in Benin since 1990 until 2010, while 
there were three regular leadership changes due to elections or term and age limits, as 
shown in the Archigos Dataset of Political Leaders (Goemans, Skrede and Chiozza 2009).  
 
 
Burkina Faso 
A membership score of 0 is given to Burkina Faso in terms of rate of opposition because is 
the least permissive country in letting the opposition participate in elections. Even though 
in later elections the country allowed some opposition parties to participate, only one party 
did in the 1991 elections (Compaoré through the ODP-MT party) and three took part in 
1998 (CDP, UVDB and FR-RDA), as stated in the African Elections Database. In this same 
line, opposition parties are considered the weakest because of the predominance of the 
Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) party and the inability of the opposition to 
fight against Compaoré, despite the boycotts in 1991 and 1998. In terms of political 
mobilization, protests in Burkina Faso were not so numerous at the beginning of the 
transition to multiparty elections (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 286). However, the 
number increased and the country experienced later a fairly relevant level of political 
protests, especially during 1999 and 2000, as shown in the ACLED Data. Trade unions 
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have had an outstanding role since independence in 1958. The demonstrations taking place 
in December 1998 right after journalist Norbert Zongo’s murder are remarkable (Hagberg 
2002, 237).  
 
Burkina Faso is given the highest score regarding corruption in the country. This decision is 
supported by figures provided by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
Even though practices like freedom of press have been allowed in later years, the public 
sphere has committed other severe crimes. Impunity, this is, the lack of punishment after a 
crime, has been a main concern among civil groups of the country (Hagberg 2002, 218). 
Similarly, despite the existence of term limits that allow being re-elected twice, Campaoré 
managed to stay in power for all the time period under consideration, so no turnovers have 
taken place. Therefore, a membership score of 1 is assigned regarding time in power. A 
high level of foreign aid has also been directed to Burkina Faso, as shown in the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017). Considered one of the highest 
recipients of aid in West Africa, money has been invested in education and the 
empowerment of rural areas (Samoff 2003, 408; Bado 2012, 36).  
 
Burkina Faso is not considered a very diverse country in terms of ethnicities. While more 
than half of the population is composed of the Mossi ethnic group, the remaining existing 
groups are rural minorities (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). Fearon (2003, 218) and 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005, 319) support this fact with the ethnic fractionalization 
indexes provided. It is worth stating that Burkina Faso is said to have a “docile political 
culture” (Fearon and Laitin 2006). For that matter, in terms of EAC, Burkina Faso was 
given the lowest possible (0) score due to the inexistence of relevant ethnic conflict during 
the time period studied. Similarly, EPR are not considered relevant for this country so the 
same score is assigned. Lastly, a membership score of 0 is given for both regular and 
irregular change in leadership, as shown in the Archigos Dataset of Political Leaders. Since 
Campaoré ruled from 1987 until 2014 there are no changes in leadership along the time 
frame considered.  
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Central African Republic 
Regarding the rate of opposition in Central African Republic, 0.4 membership score is 
given due to a certain and constant allowance for opposition parties to participate in 
elections. Similarly, opposition parties are considered not too weak. Despite the existence 
of some independent candidates, power in parliament is quite shared among political 
parties, as observed in the African Elections Database. Political mobilization in Central 
African Republic was fairly high during the early 1990s due to adjustment programs carried 
out by governments to tackle economic slumps (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 133).  This 
data is supported by the ACLED Data, which shows a decrease in political protests in the 
2000s after years of turmoil in the previous decade.  
 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators consider a low level of corruption in the country, so 
a membership score of 0.2 is given. It was Patassé’s leadership that was considered more 
corrupt and self-interested (Mehler 2011, 122) In terms of time in power, two turnovers 
took place during the time period considered. Despite this fact, Patassé had a dominant 
position in the country for 10 years until Bozizé overthrew him from power through a coup. 
After that Patassé was banned to participate in the 2005 elections, while being judicially 
processed (Mehler 2011, 125-126). Therefore, a 0.6 membership score is considered due to 
Patassé’s dominance mainly disrupted by coups and different attempts to keep him out of 
office. Besides this, Central African Republic is considered the country receiving the least 
amount of foreign aid, according to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators on 
official aid.    
 
A membership score of 1 is given to ethnic diversity, since the country is considered one of 
the most ethnically diverse states among cases considered (Alesina et al. 2003, 185; Fearon 
2003, 218). As of 1990, there was a sharing of power in the country and only the Gulas, 
who represent a very small proportion of the ethnic groups, were discriminated. However, 
since 2006 Bayas became the dominant ethnic group in the political arena, and the rest were 
powerless, as shown in the Ethnic Power Relations Database. Therefore, the membership 
score for EPR is considered 0.6. The same score is given for EAC, due to various events of 
ethnic conflict in the 2000s and the fact that conflict has escalated with every change in 
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leadership, which has been related to ethnicity (Isaacs-Martin 2016, 32).  Lastly, a regular 
exit of Kolingba led to a regular entry of Patassé in 1993, while Bozizé also experienced a 
regular entry in 2003. However, Patassé’s exit in 2003 is considered irregular due to a coup 
d’etat that overthrown him from power. Therefore, 0.6 and 0.2 respectively are assigned to 
Central African Republic, considering the Archigos Dataset of Political Leaders.  
 
 
Chad 
Even though the number of opposition parties that participated in elections in Chad has 
decreased in 2001 and 2006, a certain number of parties were allowed, so membership 
score is 0.4. However, opposition parties are regarded as very weak mainly due to the 
Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) dominance in parliament, as shown in the African 
Elections Database. In this same line, political mobilization in Chad scores 0 due to a low 
level of protests recorded from 1990 until 2010 by Bratton and van de Walle (1997, 286) 
and the ACLED Data. Some reasons behind this include the banning of demonstrations 
against the government interests or the legal limits imposed to workers in the public sector 
to strike (Freedom House, 2015).  
 
In terms of corruption, Chad is the country recording lower levels among cases selected, as 
displayed by the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank. However it is worth 
stating that stances of misallocation of funds and prosecution have been reported (Freedom 
House, 2015).  The maximum score is given for time in power since Idriss Déby ruled 
along all the time period considered despite fraud accusation and attaining power through 
revolt in 1990 (Hansen 2013).  Therefore, no turnovers were allowed. Besides this, and 
despite the opportunities offered by the oil sector in Chad, the World Development 
Indicators report a low contribution of foreign aid to the country, which could be caused by 
the unstable situation during Deby’s mandates and the constant turmoil between Chad and 
Sudan (Hansen 2013, 587).  
 
Both Fearon (2003, 218) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005, 319) report one of the 
highest scores for Chad in terms of ethnic diversity, so an 0.8 membership score is given. 
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Similarly, a membership score of 0.8 is assigned to the country in terms of EPR, because of 
the exclusion of the Arabs and Toubous these being more numerous than the groups 
sharing power. In the case of EAC, a 1 score is assigned because of the persistence of ethnic 
conflicts. Lastly, it is worth stating that Idriss Déby ruled Chad from 1990 until 2014, and 
came to power through revolt. Therefore, a score of 0 is assigned to regular and 0.6 to 
irregular leadership changes, because of Habre’s irregular exit and Déby’s irregular entry in 
1990, as portrayed by the Archigos Dataset.  
 
 
Republic of Congo 
Since high rate of opposition parties is present in most elections in the Republic of Congo, 
a 0.8 membership score is given. However, the country is considered a one party dominant 
state. Even though opposition parties are allowed, they don’t have real chances of leading. 
This is mainly the case from 2002 with the dominance of the Congolese Labour Party 
(PCT), as observed in the African Elections Database. For this reason a 0.8 membership 
score is given for weakness of opposition. Regarding political mobilization, a 0 score is 
given just like in the case of Chad, since only a few protests are recorded by Bratton and 
van de Walle (1997, 286) and the ACLED Data, compared to the rest of the cases 
concerning. In this sense, even though assembly and association are usually permitted, 
demonstrations have been uncommon (Freedom House, 2010).   
 
Regarding matters of corruption, the country scores low according to Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. However the judiciary has not always been free and fair and corrupt 
practices have been detected in the oil sector (Freedom House, 2010). Although the 
Republic of Congo has experienced two turnovers since 1990 until 2010, the membership 
score for time in power is 0.4. This is mainly due to Nguesso’s increasing dominance 
during most of the period (Freedom House 2010). Besides this, just like in the case of 
Chad, the World Development Indicators report a low contribution of foreign aid to the 
country, probably because of the insecurity created by Nguesso’s leadership.  
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The Republic of Congo is considered a highly diverse country in terms of ethnicity 
(Alesina et al 2003, 185; Fearon 2003, 218). In this same line, relevant groups like Nibolek 
or Batéké have been left irrelevant or powerless, as shown by the EPR database, so 
membership score is 0.8. A membership score of 0.4 is assigned to EAC mainly due to the 
length of the ethnic conflicts that started in 1993 between political rivalries and continued 
in 1997 with a Civil War (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999, 38). As a final remark, 0.2 
membership score is assigned to the Republic of Congo in terms of regular leadership 
change due to Lissouba’s regular entry in 1992. However, 0.6 is assigned to irregular 
leadership change because Lissouba experienced an irregular exit in 1997 leading to an 
irregular entry of Nguesso, as stated in the Archigos Dataset.  
 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Despite the improvement in later elections, Côte d’Ivoire scores 0.2 in terms of rate of 
opposition because only two parties were allowed in elections of 1990 and 1995. In this 
same line opposition parties are considered fairly weak; there is an increasing number of 
independent candidates throughout time and the PDCI-RDA rally has usually dominated in 
parliament. All of this is observed in the African Elections Database. In terms of political 
mobilization, Côte d’Ivoire is considered the strongest country among those analysed. 
Similar to the case of the Central African Republic, protests prominent in the 1990s when 
economic reforms were implemented to tackle high fiscal deficits (Bratton and van de 
Walle 1997, 133).  
 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators displays a certain level of corruption in the country, 
but not as high as other cases considered. Some instances of corruption include a missing 
$30 million aid packet from the European Union which should have been directed to health 
matters in 1999 (Chirot 2006, 69). Even though changes in power have not always been 
considered democratic in the country, there were three different turnovers through elections 
in the time frame studied. This means that leaders have not spent long time periods in 
power, so 0.4 score is given to this variable.  Besides this, Côte d’Ivoire is regarded as one 
of the biggest recipients of foreign aid in the region, according to the World Bank’s World 
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Development Indicators. This is supported by the fact that, in the 1990s, around 32% of 
government expenditure came from foreign aid, which was equivalent to 11% of the 
country’s GDP (McGillivray and Ouattara 2005, 249).  
 
Population in Côte d’Ivoire is considered very diverse, with more than 60 different ethnic 
groups (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, 319; El-Khawas and Anyu 2014, 41). 
Therefore, a 1 membership score for ethnic diversity is given. In terms of EPR, Southern 
Mande, Northerners and Krus are generally registered as discriminated, irrelevant and 
powerless despite their considerable size as an ethnic group, while Baules and other Akans 
have been sharing power; for that matter a 1 score is given. However, the only main ethnic 
tensions took place during the Civil War (2002-2004) so the EAC score is 0.2. The same 
low score is assigned to regular leadership change, since only Bedie came to power through 
elections in 1993. However, a coup in 1999 together with Guei’s irregular entry and exit 
and Gbagbo’s irregular entry in 2000, are the reasons behind a membership score of 1 for 
irregular leadership change.  
 
 
Guinea  
Guinea has a membership score of 0.6 in terms of rate of opposition because of an 
improved participation of the opposition, reaching up to 24 parties in the 2010 elections. 
Besides this, opposition is considered fairly strong despite Conté’s ruling of the country 
until 2010. This is because seats in parliament are quite shared and percentage votes in 
elections were divided among parties. These facts are observed in the African Elections 
Database. In terms of political mobilization, Guinea scores 0.8 due to a high level of 
protests during the time period considered. The several general strikes that took place 
between 2006 and 2007 resulted in mass demonstrations against the government, and were 
especially relevant for the country  (Picard and Moudoud 2010, 57; Schroven 2010, 668).  
 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators show that corruption is not the highest among cases 
analysed. However, some illegal practices like misallocation of funds and resources or 
money extortion through contracts did take place. Even though some restrictions towards 
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the elite have been introduced, these problems were not confronted during Conté’s regime 
(Picard and Moudoud 2010, 58-59). Guinea scores high regarding time in power due to 
Conté’s dominance in government (1984-2008). There is a single turnover that took place 
in 2010 where Condé won the elections and substituted him (African Elections Database). 
In this same line, Guinea has not been the first destination for foreign aid, largely due to 
fear and insecurity produced by Conté’s military regime (Picard and Moudoud 2010, 52), 
these being supported by the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.   
 
Guinea is not considered a deeply divided society (Fearon 2003, 218; Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol 2005, 319), since the country is mostly divided according to four different 
geographical regions, ruled by a powerful group (Bah 2016, 291). Regarding EPR, Peul 
ethnic group, representing around 40% of the population, has been historically 
discriminated. However the rest of the groups have the sharing power as well as 
discriminating each other interchangeably, so a 0.4 score is given. In terms of EAC, the 
score is 0.2 because of ethnic tensions during elections. Lastly, both Konate and Condé 
experienced regular exit and entry from power respectively, which assigns 0.4 to regular 
leadership change. In terms of irregular leadership change, Guinea scores 0.8 due to 
Camara’s irregular entry and exit in 2008 and 2009, as well as Konate’s irregular entry.  
 
 
Mali 
Mali has a membership score of 0.8 in terms of rate of opposition because of a high 
allowance of opposition party participation. However there was a specific decrease in 1997 
elections where only two parties participated due to a boycott by main opposition party. 
Besides, opposition parties are not considered very strong due to ADEMA’s dominance in 
parliament until 2002 and the strength of independent candidates throughout the time 
period (African Elections Database). Bratton and van de Walle (2013, 861) and the ACLED 
Data do not find much evidence of political mobilization in the country so 0.2 membership 
score is given.  
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Regarding corruption, Mali has suffered from corrupt elites at a national level but also from 
regional ‘big men’ in the process of liberalization (Bøås and Torheim 2013, 1280). In sum, 
not only the government but also the public sector as a whole participated in corruption 
scandals (Resnick and van de Walle 2013, 98-102). For that matter, membership score is 
0.8. Time in power is fairly high (0.6) because both Konaré and Touré managed to stay two 
5-year terms in power, as maximum time stipulated in the constitution since 1992. Besides 
this, foreign aid has been considered very important for Mali’s development. During the 
1990s it meant up to 50% of the annual budget or, for instance, the country received a $460 
million grant from the US government in 2004, becoming one of the top aid recipients in 
the region (Resnick and van de Walle 2013, 88).  
 
Mali is considered a considerable diverse country in terms of ethnicity (Dunning and 
Harrison 2010, 22) and both Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005, 319) and Fearon (2003, 
218) support this fact with the ethnic fractionalization indexes. A 0.2 score is given for EPR 
because, even though Blacks clearly exceed the size of White groups, there has been 
discrimination towards the latter. However, ethnicity is not considered a main factor 
affecting political relations and outcomes in the country (Dunning and Harrison 2010, 23).  
In terms of EAC, the score is 0.4 mainly due to the length of the ethnic conflicts. Lastly, 
Mali scores 0.8 in regular leadership change because of Konaré’s regular entry and exit 
from government, as well as Touré’s regular exit induced by term limits and subsequent 
elections. On the other hand, irregular leadership change scores 0.4 due to a coup in 1991, 
which meant Traoré’s irregular exit and lead to Touré’s irregular entry. These facts are 
shown in the Archigos Dataset.  
 
 
Niger 
Despite a constant participation of opposition parties in Niger’s elections, the rate is low 
throughout the years, so membership score is 0.2. However, opposition parties are 
considered the strongest among the cases under study because seats in parliament are 
shared, giving a chance to the opposition to participate, as observed in the African Elections 
Database. The strength of opposition has been related to the existence of a broad range of 
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trade unions that led mass mobilizations and fostered political competition at the beginning 
of the transition to a multiparty system (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 148). Therefore, a 
high score is given for political mobilization in the country (0.8).  
 
Corruption in Niger is not the highest among countries under study. However, malpractice 
in the judiciary and politically motivated illegal actions in the public sector are common 
practices (Freedom House, 2009). Niger has the lowest score for the variable concerning 
time in power due to a high level of turnovers in the time period considered. Despite the 
fact that two coups took place in 1996 and 1999, and terms limits were not introduced until 
2010, three different presidents were chosen through elections and ruled the country 
(African Elections Database). Besides this, a fairly high level of foreign aid has been 
delivered to the country throughout the years. However, the rejection towards the approval 
of different adjustment programs directed by the IMF and Western donors decreased aid 
from 1992 until 1994 (Gazibo 2005, 77).  
 
Niger is considered the least ethnically diverse country among these considered (Alesina et 
al 2003, 185; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, 319). In this same line, according to the 
EPR database, the ethnic groups are not very relevant politically, so membership is set at 
0.4. Even though Peuls and Toubous have usually been irrelevant or discriminated, they 
represent a very small proportion of the ethnic groups. The rest have changed status since 
the 1990, sharing power in government in some cases. However in the case of EAC, a 0.8 
score is assigned because of the persistence of ethnic conflicts. Lastly, Niger has a 
membership score of 1 for both regular and irregular leadership change due to coups in 
1996, 1999 and 2010, which implied irregular entries and exits, but at the same time led to 
elections in 1993, 1996 and 1999, as observed in the Archigos Dataset.  
 
 
Senegal 
Senegal scores 0.6 with respect to the rate of opposition due to a decent participation of 
opposition parties in elections, increasing from 8 in 2000 to 15 in 2007. However, it is also 
in 2007 when opposition is considered less strong due to dominance of the Sopi 2007 
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coalition dominating in parliament and the increase of independent candidates (African 
Elections Database). Political mobilization in Senegal has been especially relevant in the 
second half of the time period considered (1990-2010). In this sense, the ACLED Data 
records a high level of political protests during July and August 2000, some months after 
the first election of president Wade.  
 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators place Senegal at the top of the list of the countries 
under study regarding corruption. It is more precisely the anticorruption commission that 
has been accused of numerous scandals; however corrupt practices have been present in 
most groups of the Senegalese society, even in the relationship between the press and the 
government (Mbow 2008, 158-165). Despite the introduction of a two-year term limit in 
2001, Wade’s leadership dominated during the time period considered and was elected in 
2000 and 2007, despite fraud allegations in the latter (Freedom House, 2011). Due to these 
facts, the country scores high in terms of time in power. Besides this, the highest score is 
assigned regarding foreign aid, according to figures presented by World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. For instance, and similar to the case of Mali presented above, 
Senegal received $540 million to tackle poverty as part of the US Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) (Freedom House, 2011).  
 
Senegal is not considered a very diverse country in terms of ethnicity (Alesina et al 2003, 
185; Fearon 2003, 218). Besides this, as the EPR database shows, ethnic groups are not 
very relevant politically, so a score of 0.2 is assigned. Even though power is shared among 
ethnic groups, Wolofs are stronger in Government since the 1980s, but also form almost 
have of the population. A 0.4 score is allocated to EAC for Senegal due to the length of the 
ethnic fighting in the Calamanco region. Finally, the country scores 0.4 due to Diout’s 
regular exit and Wade’s regular entry through elections in 2000. However, no irregular 
changes in leadership are reported in the Archigos Dataset during the time frame 
considered, so membership score of 0 is assigned.  
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